Incomplete information

Robert J. Aumann, Aviad Heifetz

نتاج البحث: فصل من :كتاب / تقرير / مؤتمرفصلمراجعة النظراء


In interactive contexts such as games and economies, it is important to take account not only of what the players believe about substantive matters (such as payoffs), but also of what they believe about the beliefs of other players. Two different but equivalent ways of dealing with this matter, the semantic and the syntactic, are set forth. Canonical and universal semantic systems are then defined and constructed, and the concepts of common knowledge and common priors formulated and characterized. The last two sections discuss relations with Bayesian games of incomplete information and their applications, and with interactive epistemology - the theory of multi-agent knowledge and belief as formulated in mathematical logic.

اللغة الأصليةالإنجليزيّة
عنوان منشور المضيفHandbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
المحررونRobert Aumann, Sergiu Hart
عدد الصفحات22
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء
حالة النشرنُشِر - 2002
منشور خارجيًانعم

سلسلة المنشورات

الاسمHandbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
مستوى الصوت3
رقم المعيار الدولي للدوريات (المطبوع)1574-0005

ملاحظة ببليوغرافية

Funding Information:
*Important input from Sergiu Hart, Martin Meier, and Dubi Samet is gratefully acknowledged. *Research partially supported under NSF grant SES-9730205.


أدرس بدقة موضوعات البحث “Incomplete information'. فهما يشكلان معًا بصمة فريدة.

قم بذكر هذا